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INTRODUCTION
In September 2000, a student at New Mexico State University was arrested
after disobeying a police officer's request to stop leafleting outside the student
union because it was not an "open forum area." I At the University of Mississippi in
the same year, a student was arrested for protesting the student newspaper outside
the school's only designated speech area. 2 In November 2001, police ejected a
West Virginia University student from a Disney on-campus recruiting seminar
because the student had previously handed out anti-Disney flyers outside of the
designated zone. 3 And in 2002, twelve Florida State University students were
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; A.B., 1998,
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor. I would like to thank Professor Susan Williams for her
early suggestions and comments, Jennifer Shea and the Indiana Law Journal Board of
Editors for helpful feedback, and Katie Marie McWhorter for selflessly proofreading an
early draft of this Note. Finally, I thank my father, Thomas F. Davis, for teaching me how to
write.
1. See Randal C. Archibold, Boxing in Free Speech, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8, 2001, § 4A
(Education Life Supplement), at 23. The student, an opponent of the university's policy of
maintaining "free speech zones," was passing out leaflets to promote his free underground
newspaper. Id. The charges were later dropped, but the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU") sued on behalf of the student. Id. The suit was settled later that year, resulting in
the abolishment of the "free speech zones" as well as a new policy clarifying free speech
rights. Id.
2. See Mary M. Kershaw, Free Speech Has Its Place-or Several-on USA's
Campuses, USA TODAY, May 13, 2002, at 6D.
3. See Michael A. Fuoco, Students Protest WVU Free Speech Zones, Prrr. POSTGAZETrE, Feb. 13, 2002, at A-2.
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arrested for trespassing after refusing to move their protest from in front of the
administration building to a less visible "demonstration zone." 4 Incidents such as
these, involving university policies that limit student expression to defined areas of
campus, 5 have caused an outcry among students, 6 university officials, 7 and civil
liberties groups,8 who have derided such zones as incompatible with the
constitutional guarantee of free speech. 9 This popular opposition has pressured
some universities to change their speech zone policies.' Universities have also
abolished their free speech zones due to the threat of lawsuit, or as a condition of
settlement of lawsuits." These factors may explain why there have been few court
decisions on the constitutionality of these restrictions.
Every university is unique, as is every regulation creating a free speech zone.
However, these zones do raise common questions. The First Amendment is clearly
implicated when a public university regulates student speech, but since the legality
of speech zones has not seriously been tested it is uncertain what legal framework
would be used to analyze restrictions on that speech. 12 This Note analyzes the

4. See Alisa Ulferts, Keeping Protestersin One Area Isn't Free Speech, CriticsSay, ST.
Apr. 29, 2002, at 1B [hereinafter Ulferts, Keeping]. The students were

PETERSBURG TIMEs,

protesting the administration's purchasing of university apparel produced in foreign
sweatshops. Id. In September 2002, a jury acquitted the students of the misdemeanor
trespassing charges. See Alisa Ulferts, Protesters Who Put up Tents in FSU Walkway
Acquitted of Trespassing, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002, at 5B.

5. There are several names for these place regulations. Unless referring to a specific
policy, this Note will refer to them as "free speech zones" or "speech zones."
6. See, e.g., Fuoco, supra note 3 (describing a student demonstration against the West
Virginia University speech zones); Nahal Toosi, PoliticalActivity Ban Suspended; UWWhitewater Students, Faculty Criticized Rule, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 16, 2002, at

03B (describing the suspension of a policy involving free speech zones due to student and
faculty protest).
7. See, e.g., Mary M. Kershaw, WVU Students Are at GreaterLiberty to Protest, USA
13, 2002, at 6D (quoting a West Virginia University spokesperson that the
school was reviewing its policy due to "unfortunate incidents"); Ulferts, Keeping, supra note
4 (quoting a spokesperson from the University of South Florida that its faculty opposed
instituting free speech zones).
8. See, e.g., Harvey A. Silverglate & Joshua Gewolb, Muzzling Free Speech, NAT'L
L.J., Sept. 30, 2002, at A20. Silverglate is the co-founder of the Foundation for Individual
Rights in Education ("FIRE"). An archive of media stories concerning free speech issues
affecting colleges and universities may be found on the FIRE's website at
http://www.thefire.org (last visited Jan. 27, 2004).
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. See, e.g., Archibold, supra note 1 (describing the modification of speech codes at
Pennsylvania State University following complaints of "stifled" expression and describing
the failure of speech codes to be instituted at the University of South Florida due to faculty
opposition).
11. See id. (noting that New Mexico State University dropped its free speech zones
following the settlement of the ACLU lawsuit).
12. See Erik Forde Ugland, Hawkers, Thieves and Lonely Pamphleteers: Distributing
Publications in the University Marketplace, 22 J.C. & U.L. 935, 946-47 (1996). Ugland
notes that some courts have held that public .forum analysis is inapplicable as applied to
student speech on school grounds and instead have maintained that restrictions on student
speech can be upheld only if they meet the test from Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969). Tinker declared that free speech
by students is "an important part of the educational process" and that while in school or on
TODAY, May
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question of free speech zones under the assumption that the courts will use public
forum doctrine.13
Speech zone regulations are ostensibly content-neutral since all speakers,
regardless of the content of their speech, are affected. Courts are more deferential
to content-neutral regulations of the time, place, and manner of speech.14 However,
that deference has limits. Questions about the nature of the university campus
define some of those limits. What is the relationship between a university's campus
and the compatibility of that campus with free expression? Are all areas of the
university similarly compatible? For what reason does the university seek to
impose the place restrictions? Do the place restrictions go too far by restricting too
much space, and thereby too much speech? Do the size and location of the zones
leave sufficient alternatives for would-be speakers to express themselves? All of
these issues are relevant. The ultimate question, then, is this: are these zones
unlawful restrictions on speech, or are they merely reasonable restrictions on the
time, place, and manner of speech? This Note explores that question. Because the
uniqueness of each university precludes a definitive answer, this Note seeks to
identify potential avenues for challenging these restrictions, and the particular
factors that would make such challenges more persuasive. Further, to avoid
discussing these universities and regulations in the abstract, this Note will
hypothesize about the constitutionality of free speech zones with a concrete
example from an era preceding much of the Supreme Court's public forum
jurisprudence.
Part I will discuss how campus speech zones can be conceptualized using
public forum doctrine 15 and will examine the 1970 Fifth Circuit case of Bayless v.
Martine,16 the facts of which will serve as the basis for a hypothetical speech zone
challenge under public forum doctrine. Part II will analyze potential challenges to
free speech zones if the grounds of universities are considered public fora, focusing
on the time, place, or manner test for the validity of content-neutral speech
restrictions. 17 Part HI will discuss the implications for speech zone regulations if a
campus were considered a nonpublic forum. Part IV considers the utility of nonlegal options for eliminating speech zones. The Note will conclude by arguing that
static place restrictions, which banish student expression to limited areas of
campus a student may exercise those rights unless they "materially disrupt[] classwork or
involve[] substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." Id. at 512-13.
13. This has been the approach used by courts that have analyzed free speech zone
restrictions at public universities. See infra Part H.A.
14. See infra Part Il.B.
15. The Supreme Court has identified three types of public property for First
Amendment purposes. The traditional public forum, open to speech and assembly by
historical tradition; the designated public forum, opened to expression in whole or part by
government fiat; and the nonpublic forum, an area not opened to public expression. See
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-47 (1983); see also infra
Part I.
16. 430 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1970).
17. The time, place, or manner test is as follows:
[I]n a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions
on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the
restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quotations omitted).
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universities, are unwise and potentially unconstitutional, and that universities can
properly balance free expression with the need to fulfill their educational missions
by maintaining reasonable time and manner restrictions on disruptive activities,
while allowing peaceful, non-disruptive students the right to exercise their First
Amendment rights wherever they feel their message can best be expressed.
I. DEFINING THE FRAMEWORK
A. Public Forum Doctrine
Under the "public forum" doctrine, government property can be categorized in
three different ways: as a traditional public forum, a designated public forum, or a
nonpublic forum.18 Because the public's right of access to government property for
speech purposes differs depending on that property's forum status, it is necessary to
determine how any particular area on university property is to be classified. A brief
description of the doctrine follows. 19
The traditional public forum consists solely of places such as "streets and
parks which 'have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.' 20 The designated
public forum is created by governmental action. Such a forum can be opened to all
expressive activity, or opened only on a limited basis to particular groups or for the
discussion of particular subjects.' However, mere governmental toleration of
speech on public property does not suffice; the government must take an
affirmative step to create the designated forum. 22 Thus, to determine if a designated
forum exists, a court "look[s] to the policy and practice of the government to
ascertain whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly
and debate as a public forum."23 Restrictions on speech in these zones are subject
to strict scrutiny, with one exception. 24 A time, place, or manner restriction in a
designated public forum needs to be content-neutral and narrowly tailored to a
significant Aovernment interest, while leaving open adequate alternative channels
for speech. All public 2Vroperty that is neither a traditional nor a designated forum
is a nonpublic forum.2 Speech restrictions in a nonpublic forum need to be
"reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves" and
unmotivated by disagreement with a speaker's viewpoint. 27
18. 16A AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 519 (1998).
19. For an extensive discussion of public forum doctrine, including its history and
development, see Calvin Massey, Public Fora, Neutral Governments, and the Prism of
Property, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 309 (1999).
20. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307
U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
21. See id. at 45 & n.7.
22. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 18, § 519.
23. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (citing
Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 47).
24. The one exception: if a designated public forum is opened on a limited basis (to
classes of speakers or for certain topics), then restrictions on speech falling outside that class
or subject matter are reviewed like restrictions in a nonpublic forum. See id. at 806.
25. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); infra Part I.B.
26. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46.
27. Id. at 46, 49.
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Analyzing a university speech restriction under public forum doctrine thus
requires examination of the university campus's nature. Of course, the university is
not a monolithic entity. As one judge put it, "[a] campus of a major state university
is a microcosm of the community, and, as such, contains a variety of fora." 28 Even
so, there are clearly campus areas where unbridled expression cannot be permitted,
such as classrooms in session and professors' offices. 29 Conversely, some campus
areas must be open to all student group speech if they are open to some. 30 This
Note will focus on a forum question that is not so clear: What is the status of
outdoor areas of universities accessible to students (and usually the public at
large)? When analyzing the effects of a regulation creating a free speech zone, the
focus must be not on the location created by the zone itself, but rather the
surrounding areas where, presumably, free speech is curtailed. These are the areas
where speech regulations will be analyzed.
There are two ways to analyze the university campus forum question. Publicly
accessible campus grounds can be considered as a public forum 3' covered by a
time, place, or manner restriction. Under this model, free speech zones are areas
where those restrictions are lifted or loosened. Speech restrictions outside the zones
32
would be subject to the time, place, or manner test described below.
Alternatively, the campus can be considered a nonpublic forum. Under this model,
the free speech zones are designated public forums opened for student expression.
Speech outside these zones would be subjected to the test for restrictions on speech
28. Ala. Student Party v. Student Gov't Ass'n, 867 F.2d 1344, 1354 n.6 (llth Cir.
1989) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). Judge Tjoflat elaborated:
Some places on campus, such as the administration building or the
president's office, are not opened as fora for use by the student body,
and may be best described as nonpublic fora. Other places on campus,
such as the residence halls and fraternity and sorority houses, have been
created to allow student expression, but remain limited for use by
certain groups or for the discussion of certain subjects; these places may
be best described as limited public fora. Other places on campus, such
as the campus student union, streets, sidewalks, and park-like areas, are
freely used for student expression. These areas are best described as
traditional public fora, in which a university's ability to regulate speech
is most circumscribed. Whether a university regulation restricts student
speech in a part of its campus that is a public forum depends on the
facts of each case.
Id. See also Rodney A. Smolla, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 195, 218
(1990) ("The soundest view is to treat the campus not as one unified forum, but as
subdivided into multiple forums to which differing free speech standards apply.").
29. The private offices of professors or administrators, even though students can visit,
clearly would be nonpublic fora. Cf Families Achieving Independence & Respect v. Neb.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 111 F.3d 1408, 1420 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that a welfare office open
to the public was a non-public forum).
30. When a university opens up its facilities for use by student groups, it has created a
limited designated public forum where all such groups must be allowed access. See
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995).
31. For the purposes of this discussion, the question of whether open areas of a
university are a "traditional" public forum, a designated public forum open to everyone, or a
designated public forum limited to persons affiliated with the university, is not important;
the test for content-neutral speech restrictions in all three is the same. See Laura L.
Goodman, Note, Shacking Up with the First Amendment: Symbolic Expression and the
Public University, 64 IND. L.J. 711, 716-17 (1989).
32. See infra Part I.B
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in a nonpublic forum; that is, they must be reasonable in light of the purpose for
which the government maintains the forum and be nonviewpoint based.33 This
doctrine is applicable to the university setting as Supreme Court precedent
"leave[s] no room for the view that... First Amendment protections should apply
with less force on college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to the
contrary, 'the vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital
34
than in the community of American schools.'
B. The Archetype Case: Bayless v. Martine
Before analyzing public forum doctrine, it will be useful to have a concrete
example of a speech regulation that can serve as the target of a hypothetical free
speech challenge. I have chosen a speech regulation that was challenged before
much of the current Supreme Court public forum jurisprudence. Bayless v.
Martine35 arose out of the backdrop of campus demonstrations against the Vietnam
War. In October 1969, Southwest Texas State University students demonstrated on
campus near the Huntington Statue, in an area located between two classroom
buildings. 36 The protest lasted several hours during the school day, leading faculty
and students to complain of classroom disruption. 3No action was taken against the
students 38 even though the protest was not held in the "Student Expression Area"
during the time allowed by the student handbook.39 In November, the students
informed the administration that they planned to demonstrate at the Huntington
Statue again, from 10:00 A.M. to 2:00 P.M. 40 As before, this protest would be held
on a school day outside of the time and place specified by the handbook. 4 1 The
33. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 688-89 (1992)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); infra Part II.B.
34. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479,487 (1960)).
35. 430 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1970).
36. Id. at 875. For a map and photograph of the statue and the area as it looks today, see
http://www.maps.txstate.edu/derr.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2004). The school has recently
changed its name to Texas State University-San Marcos. See http://www.txstate.edu/
name-change (last visited Jan. 27, 2004).
37. Bayless, 430 F.2d at 875.
38. Id. at 877.
39. The provision in "Student's Rights" section of the handbook read as follows:
STUDENT EXPRESSION AREA
Students and University personnel may use the Student Expression Area
located on the grass terraces in front of Old Main between the hours of
12:00 noon to 1:00 p. m. [sic], and from 5:00 to 7:00 p. m. [sic].
Reservations for the Student Expression Area are made through the
Dean of Students Office and must be made at least 48 hours in advance.
Rules to be observed by users of the area include:
1. No interference with the free flow of traffic.
2. No interruption of the orderly conduct of University affairs.
3. No obscene materials.
4. Person making the reservation is responsible for seeing that the area
is left clean and in a good state of repair.
Id. at 875. The student expression area was described by the court as "centrally located
on the University campus and... surrounded by classroom buildings." Id.
40. Id. at 876.
41. Id.

2004]

FREE SPEECHZONES

university feared more classroom disruption but attempted to accommodate the
students by permitting the demonstration at the Huntington Statue on the condition
that it be limited from noon to 1:00 P.M. 4 2 The students were warned that a
violation of this compromise would lead to disciplinary action.43 Despite this
warning, students began assembling at the statue starting at 9:45 A.M. 44 The
students, numbering fifty, sat silently on the grass until Dean of Students Floyd
Martine arrived and warned the students to leave. 45 Ten students refused to go and
were threatened with suspension if they did not disperse.46 The students did not
leave and were suspended until the 1970 fall term.47
The suspended students brought suit against the university seeking an
injunction preventing their suspension and a declaratory judgment that the Student
Expression Area regulation was unconstitutional under the First Amendment.48 The
Fifth Circuit disagreed. It held that the regulation was "a valid exercise of the
University's right to adopt and enforce reasonable, non-discriminatory regulations
as to the time, place and manner of student expressions and demonstrations. ' 49
Supporting the constitutionality of the regulation, the court noted, was the
regulation's permissiveness. By stating that students "may" use the Student
Expression Area, the regulation did not expressly prohibit demonstrations
elsewhere on campus. 50 The court also noted the reasonableness of the regulation
was "underscore[d]" by the extraordinary lengths the university took to secure
alternative accommodations for the students. 5' Judge Thomberry, in concurrence,
went further in discussing the permissiveness of the regulation. Although he
believed the suspension was justified,52 he felt that the rationale for that
punishment could not be the students' violation of the handbook regulation.53 In
order to read the regulation as prohibiting the conduct of the students, the rule
would have to be interpreted as disallowing student expression in other areas and at
different times, a construction that would have rendered the rule invalid "for
several reasons. 54 Among these reasons was an understanding that reading the
regulation to restrict student assembly outside the Student Expression Area "would
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. The students claimed that the statute was overbroad and constituted a prior restraint
on speech. Id. at 875.
49. Id. at 878 (citations omitted).
50. Id.
51. Id. ("[The permissiveness of the regulation] is coupled with the administration's
prior and present efforts to allow these very students maximum freedom of expression
consistent with its duty to operate the college as an educational institution ....
").
52. The concurrence stated that the students could be punished for violating the Dean's
ad hoc regulation of the time and place of the demonstration, for that regulation was
reasonable and lawful. Id. at 881 (Thornberry, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 880 (Thornberry, J., concurring).
54. "First, [the prohibitive construction of the regulation would] require[] a
real stretch ...to infer this meaning ....Second, the rule was not so
construed when applied to other student assemblies, and... [t]hird, it
would restrict student assemblies to so small an area and so brief a time
as to be unreasonable if strictly enforced." Id. at 881 n.2 (Thornberry, J.,
concurring).
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restrict student assemblies to so small an area and so brief a time as to be
unreasonable if strictly enforced." 5
The regulation in Bayless was thus construed so that it did not expressly
restrict student speech to the area specified in the student handbook. However, it is
easy to imagine that the regulation could have been written restrictively, stating
that students "must use" instead of "may use" the grounds specified.56 Such a
regulation today would resemble a free speech zone. Would this place regulation
withstand judicial scrutiny? 57 This modified version of the Bayless regulation will
serve as our hypothetical speech zone regulation that can be tested against the
requirements of the First Amendment. This Note will return to this hypothetical
regulation as it analyzes various potential challenges to speech zone regulations.
II. THE UNIVERSrrY AS A PUBLIC FORUM

A. Is the Public University a Public Forum?
In footnote five of Widmar v. Vincent the Supreme Court stated, "the campus
of a public university, at least for its students, possesses many of the characteristics
of a public forum., 59 At the same time, the Court noted that this did not mean that
"a university must grant free access to all of its grounds or buildings." 6 But what
about those grounds that the university has granted open access to? Seizing on the
language of Widmar, various commentators have argued that open areas on
university campuses should be considered public fora.6' Courts have often agreed,
finding public areas on campuses to be designated public fora despite the insistence
of the universities to the contrary.62 Courts often have found that a university has
opened its campus to expressive activity (and thereby created a designated public
forum) with surprising ease. Boilerplate language in university mission
statements 63 or the opening of facilities to use by some student groups has been

55. Id. (Thornberry, J., concurring).
56. See supra note 39 for the full text of the regulation.
57. While this may seem extreme, some regulations designating "free speech areas" are
this restrictive. See infra notes 244-45, 252-56, and accompanying text.
58. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
59. Id. at 267 n.5.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Juliane N. McDonald, Brister v. Faulkner and the Clash of Free Speech
and Good Order on the College Campus, 28 J.C. & U.L. 467, 491 (2002) (arguing that in
light of Supreme Court statements about the importance of universities to the nation, and the
dangers of restricting speech in them, that college campuses should be considered the
"proto-typical" public fora); Smolla, supra note 28, at 217-19 (reasoning that most areas of
public universities should be considered designated public fora).
62. See, e.g., Pro-Life Cougars v. Lee, Civil Action No. H-02-219, Order for Prelim.
Inj. (S.D. Tex. Jun. 24, 2002) (finding that Butler Plaza, a centrally located area on the
campus of the University of Houston, is a designated public forum) (on file with author);
Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333, 338 (W.D. Va. 1987)
(finding central lawn of the University of Virginia to be a traditional public forum);
Spartacus Youth League v. Bd. of Trs., 502 F. Supp. 789, 798-99 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (holding
that the student union of the University of Illinois, Circle Center, was a public forum).
63. See Khademi v. S. Orange County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 194 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1024
(C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that the language "[t]he [college] is committed to assuring that all
persons may exercise their ...rights protected under the First Amendment ...throughout
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enough. 64 The mere structure of the public university has been accepted as proof of
a governmental design to create a designated public forum. For example, in Hays
County Guardian v. Supple65 the Fifth Circuit held that the grounds of Southwest
Texas State University comprised the "site of a community of full-time residents..
. where people may enjoy the open air or the company of friends and neighbors in a
relaxed environment." 66 Such a place, the court held, is "more akin to a public
street or park than a non-public forum." 67 Other courts go further in finding
parallels between the open spaces of university grounds and open areas such as
68
public parks in deciding that university grounds are in fact traditionalpublic fora.
Notably, the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice
Anthony Kennedy, has advanced the view that universities have historically been
open to all speech.69 Such a historical background
would be a prerequisite to the
70
recognition of a traditional public forum.
These findings, that the campus of the public university is at the very least a
designated public forum, represent the most rational approach. On a visceral level
this seems self-evident. Universities are places of higher learning and intellectual
pursuit-they are the quintessential "marketplace of ideas.'
The notion that a
university's campus has not been opened for the expressive activity of students
seems antithetical.72 The rhetorical argument that free speech zones are actually
"censorship zones" that silence students, while not completely accurate, 73 is
nonetheless effective. 74 Administrators, in defending their speech zone policies,
the facilities under its jurisdiction" left "no doubt" that the areas open to the public were
public fora).
64. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995).
65. 969 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1992).
66. Id. at 117 (quoting Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640,
651 (1981).
67. Id.
68. Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333, 338 (W.D. Va.

1987) (finding that the central lawn on the campus of the University of Virginia was akin to
a "municipal park").
69. [I]n the University setting.., the State acts against a background and
tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of our
intellectual and philosophic tradition, In ancient Athens, and, as Europe

entered into a new period of intellectual awakening, in places like
Bologna, Oxford, and Paris, universities began as voluntary and
spontaneous assemblages or concourses for students to speak and to
write and to learn.
Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 835-36 (1995) (citations omitted).
70. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
71. "The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace
of ideas,' .... Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).

72. Courts are quick to point this out as well. See, e.g., Auburn Alliance for Peace &

Justice v. Martin, 684 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 (M.D. Ala. 1988) ("[T]his court can think of no

place that should be more hospitable to the free expression of ideas than the campus of a
great university.").
73. They are not entirely accurate because these codes forbid only certain types of
"speech," such as protests, leafleting, and amplified sound, but not all private, personal

speech. See, e.g., infra note 93.
74. For example, a University of Texas task force recommended that the very use of the
term "free speech zone" be banned in official documents. See Narrative Report and
Recommendations from the Task Force on Assembly and Expression at the University of

Texas at Austin, to the Faculty Council of the Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Nov. 18, 2002), at

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.79:267

inevitably note that they are committed to the principles of free speech.75 Assuming
this is true, presumably speech zone regulations represent an attempt to structure
the "marketplace of ideas" so that it functions most effectively. Such power is
clearly granted to the public university. 76 However, on the college campus, like
anywhere else in the community, the protections of the First Amendment apply.77 If
the college campus is a public forum then the speech zone regulations must comply
with the requirements of the time, place, or manner test.
B. The Time, Place, or Manner Test
The "time, place, or manner" test for public forum speech restrictions, as
enunciated by the Supreme Court, states that "'the government may impose
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech' subject
to three restrictions. 7 8 First, the restrictions must be "'justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech.' 79 Second, the restrictions must be "'narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest." '8° Finally, the restrictions
must "'leave 8 open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information.-' '
The first prong, content-neutrality, entails a determination of the speech
regulation's purpose. Such a regulation cannot be enacted due to disagreement with
a speaker's message. 822 For restrictions on speech activities such as protests or
leafleting, content-neutrality requires that the restriction be "justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech., 8 3 Even a regulation that meets
this criterion can be challenged on content-neutrality grounds if the regulation
allows for speech only with the permission of a oovernment official possessing
"unbridled discretion" to grant or deny the request. Because such discretion might
allow a government official to surreptitiously use content-based or viewpoint-based
factors in deciding to grant or deny a speaker access, such a regulation requires
standards "governing the exercise of [that] discretion."85 However, if a regulation
does not contain such standards, it may still be upheld if there are implicit limits
imposed by "textual incorporation,
binding judicial or administrative construction,
86
or well-established practice."

http://www.utexas.edu/faculty/council/2002-2003/reportsTFAE.pdf (last visited Jan. 27,
2004) (on file with author).
75. See, e.g., Kershaw, supra note 2.
76. "'We ... hold that a college has the inherent power to promulgate rules and
regulations; that it has the inherent power properly to discipline; that it has power
appropriately to protect itself and its property; that it may expect that its students adhere to
generally accepted standards of conduct."' Healy, 408 U.S. at 192 (alteration in original)
(quoting Esteban v. Cent. Mo. State Coll., 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969)).
77. See id. at 180 ("[W]e note that state colleges and universities are not enclaves
immune from the sweep of the First Amendment.").
78. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
79. Id. (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
80. Id. (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
81. Id. (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
82. Id.
83. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
84. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755 (1988).
85. Id. at 763.
86. Id. at 770.
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If a regulation is content-neutral and does not give a government official
unbridled discretion, the next step is to determine whether the regulation is
narrowly tailored to a significant state interest. Courts almost always find
significant state interests, making this prong turn on the requirement of narrow
tailoring.87 The Supreme Court has held that "narrow tailoring" in this context does
not mean that the regulation must use the least speech-restrictive means available.
Instead, the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied "'so long as the . . .
regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less
effectively absent the regulation.' '8 8 Even so, the regulation cannot
be
"substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest."8 9
Finally, a constitutional time, place, or manner regulation requires a court to
determine whether an affected speaker has ample alternative methods to be heard.
Determining whether a speaker has adequate alternatives "requires a nuanced
analysis that may take account of (1) the audience to which the speaker seeks to
communicate and (2) the contribution of the desired location to the meaning of the
speech." 90 "An adequate alternative does not have to be the speaker's first choice"
but "an alternative is not adequate if it forecloses a speaker's ability to reach one
audience even if it allows the speaker to reach other groups." 9 1 Additionally, courts
have found complete bans on certain types of inexpensive methods of speech such
as leafleting to leave speakers with inadequate alternative methods of
communication. 92 With these guidelines in mind, this Note will next examine
several cases that have dealt with content-neutral First Amendment zones both on
college campuses and in other public fora to serve as a guide in determining the
potential constitutional weaknesses of campus speech zone regulations.

87. See Kevin Francis O'Neill, Disentanglingthe Law of Public Protest, 45 Loy. L.
REV. 411,438 (1999).
88. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (alteration in original)

(quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
89. Id. at 800. For an argument that the continuing efficacy of this prong of the test is
debatable following the case of Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), see The Supreme
Court: 1999 Term-Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 179, 299 (2000) ("The Hill decision
portends ... the narrow tailoring test... fad[ing] into irrelevance."). However, circuit court
decisions since Hill, striking time, place, and manner restrictions based on insufficient
tailoring, may indicate that the death of this prong has been greatly exaggerated. See, e.g.,
Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 1042 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that a ban on
peddlers within 1000 feet of the United Center in Chicago was not narrowly tailored);
Lederman v. United States, 291 F.3d 36, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2002); infra notes 126-69 and
accompanying text.
90. Million Youth March, Inc. v. Safir, 18 F. Supp. 2d 334, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(footnotes omitted).
91. Weinberg, 310 F.3d at 1041 (citations and quotations omitted).
92. "Although prohibitions foreclosing entire media may be completely free of content
or viewpoint discrimination, the danger they pose to the freedom of speech is readily
apparent-by eliminating a common means of speaking, such measures can suppress too
much speech." City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994) (invalidating ban on placing
signs on residential property); see also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163-65 (1939)
(holding unconstitutional a complete ban on leafleting in public).
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C. Cases
1. Content-Neutrality
Several cases involving speech zone regulation have found that those zones
were unconstitutional because university officials had too much discretion in
deciding what activities would be permitted. The issue of unfettered discretion was
dispositive to the issuance of a preliminary injunction in one recent case involving
some rather egregious free speech zones. In Pro-Life Cougars v. Lee,93 an antiabortion student group at the University of Houston wished to display several signs
94
as part of an exhibit in Butler Plaza, a centrally located four-acre area on campus.
The district court, in its findings of facts, chose not to describe the images on the
signs, but the media described the exhibit as "pictures of dead fetuses." 95 Per the
university's speech regulations, 96 the Pro-Life Cougars ("PLC") requested the use
of Butler Plaza to display their exhibit. 97 Although another campus group had
displayed the same exhibit a few months earlier without complaints of disruption,
Dean of Students William Munson found that the exhibit would be "potentially
disruptive" and refused to allow it in Butler Plaza. Dean Munson instead suggested
that the exhibit be placed at one of the sites specially designated for disruptive
93. Pro-Life Cougars v. Lee, Civil Action No. H-02-219, Order for Prelim. Inj. (S.D.
Tex. June 24, 2002) (on file with author).
94. Id., Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at 5-6.
95. Ron Nissimov, Anti-Abortion Display Takes Center Stage at UH; ProtestersKeep
Quiet over Butler Plaza-Exhibit,HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 4, 2002, at A23.

96. The regulation read:
The right of peaceful expression and/or assembly within the
university community must be preserved; however, the University has
the right to provide for the safety of individuals, the protection of
property, and the continuity of the educational process. The University
will not permit any individual or group of individuals to disrupt or
attempt to disrupt the operation and functioning of the University by
any device, including, but not limited to, the use of pagers, cell phones,
and other communication devices.
At least two weeks prior to an event which is potentially
disruptive, in addition to making the appropriate facility reservations,
the sponsor of the event shall meet with the Dean of Students' designate
to determine the time, place and manner of the event. Potentially

disruptive events, including events where amplified sound is used
outdoors, will be limited to the hours of 11:30 a.m. to 1 p.m. and 4 p.m.
to midnight on class days. On non-class days, potentially disruptive

events must be over by midnight. Authorized sites for events of this
nature include the University Center (UC) Arbor, UC Patio, UC
Satellite, or Lynn Eusan Park. Generated output shall not exceed the
established decibel levels. Information on established decibel levels is
available in the UC Reservations Office and the Dean of Students
Office. Any exception to this policy must be approved by the Dean of
Students.
In emergency situations, the president or designated
representatives have the responsibility to determine when the conditions
cited above prevail and shall have the authority to take such steps as are
deemed necessary and reasonable to quell or prevent such disruption.
Pro-Life Cougars,Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at 3-4.
97.1d. at6.
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activities. The PLC declined, as they felt that the "disruptive" speech zones were
too small, obscured by trees, and too far away from the areas where students
normally gathered to display their exhibit effectively. 99
The students brought suit against the university and sought an order declaring
the policy unconstitutional.'1 ° At the hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction, the university admitted that expressive activities that were
"potentially disruptive" to the educational mission were subject to different time,
place, or manner restrictions than nondisruptive ones.' 0' Dean Munson testified
that, because he had heard some complaints about some speech activities in the
Plaza, he considered all activity on the Plaza "potentially disruptive." Pursuant to
that policy, Dean Munson testified that he had banned all expressive
activity in the
0
Plaza regardless of the size or noise level of the expression.'
In ruling on the motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court first
found that the main campus of the university, including Butler Plaza, was a
designated public forum, and that the registration system was a prior restraint.'0 3
The court found that the dean had "unfettered discretion" to determine whether or
not an activity was "potentially disruptive" and that his decisions were not
constrained by any standards.' 4 As proof, the court noted that the school had
allowed the same exhibit previously, but then rejected an encore presentation even
though it had proven to be nondisruptive. 10 5 The policy did not require action
within a specified time period, nor did it require explanation for the denial.l°6 The
court thus found that the plaintiffs would likely succeed on the merits and granted a
preliminary injunction barring the use of prior restraints on any student activity
within the Plaza, and0 specifically
ordering them to allow the PLC to display their
7
anti-abortion exhibit.1
Following their loss on the motion for preliminary injunction, the university
changed their policy by removing the dean's discretion. The new policy required
all "expressive activity' 1 8 to be held in the four areas that previously were reserved
just for disruptive activity.'t 9 When the court heard the case on the merits, the
98. Id. at 5-7.
99. Id. at 7.
100. Id. at 11.
101. Id. at 8.
102. This included the removal of a Christmas tree that students had decorated, and the
banning of cheerleader practice on the Plaza. Id. The dean also testified that he would
consider "the silent expression of a single student on the Plaza holding a small sign
proclaiming 'The World is a Beautiful Place' to be potentially disruptive. Id. at 8-9.
103. Id. at 13, 15.
104. Id. at 9-10.
105. Id. at 16.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 19.
108. Defined as "[e]xtracurricular public speaking, literature distribution, poster
displays, sign displays, any other type of graphic exhibitions, expressive performances,
petitioning, or similar non-commercial activities held on University grounds." UNIV. OF
HOUSTON, STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS HANDBOOK

6 (2003), http://www.uh.edulcanpus/cactl

manual/Student%200rganizations%20Handbook%20final%20version.pdf (last visited Jan.
27, 2004) (on file with author).
109. The second regulation read:
The use of outdoor free expression areas is limited to University of
Houston faculty, staff, students, and members of registered student
organizations. The only reservable outdoor areas available to University
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harshness of the second policy affected the court's evaluation of the first.1 10 Noting
that the university never conceded that the first policy was unconstitutional, and in
light of the university's draconian response to losing the preliminary injunction, the
court found that the risk of the university reverting to the first policy precluded
mooting the students' lawsuit.' 1' The court, again noting that the campus of the
university was a public forum," 2 applied the time, place, or manner test and found
the first policy unconstitutional based on the unfettered discretion granted to the
dean. 13 The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. 14 Under pressure
from continuing legal challenges to the new policy, which the district court deemed
"hostile to free speech,"" 5 the university settled with the plaintiffs and finally
dropped the contested speech zone regulations in June 2003.1
Issues of prior restraint and unfettered discretion also proved to be fatal to
speech zone regulations at a California community college. The regulations at issue
in Burbridge v. Sampson" 7 and Khademi v. South Orange County Community
College District"8 required groups to schedule all expressive activity and to receive
prior approval for all postings and distribution of literature. 119 The regulations also
required that groups of twenty or more, and all groups wanting to use amplified
sound, use "preferred areas" for their expressive activities.' 20 The "preferred areas"
did not include a popular site in front of the "Student Services Center" that
historically had been the site of expressive activity. 121 After students successfully
won a preliminary injunction against the regulations in Burbridge due to a lack of
procedural safeguards, 122 the college changed its code.' 23 The new code was struck
down as well, in part because it granted the president "completely unfettered

of Houston faculty, staff, students, or registered student organizations
wishing to engage in expressive activities are the following: 1. Lynn
Eusan Park ... 2. University Center North Patio ... 3. University
Center Arbor... University Center Satellite Patio/Hill.
Id. at 7 (emphasis added). The second policy created one zone for expressive activity that
did not require prior approval, but even there, speech was limited to between 7:00 A.M. and
7:00 P.M. and did not allow "amplified sound... displays or exhibits ...

structures...

signs with sticks, wires, or poles of any type." Id.
110. See Pro-Life Cougars v. Univ. of Houston, 259 F. Supp. 2d 575, 580-81 (S.D. Tex.
2003) (deciding that the constitutionality of the first policy was not rendered moot because
the university revised it).
111. "Given the pervasive limitations upon outdoor free speech in the Second Policy,
the First Policy may be recalled with fondness for its 'liberality,' and hence, an attractive
alternative to which a University administration that is less hostile to free speech may well
revert." Id. at 581.
112. Id. at 582.
113. Id. at 585.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 581.

116. Ron Nissimov, UH Reaches Settlement in Suit, Agrees to Halt Curbs on Speech,
June 12, 2003, at A42.
117. 74 F. Supp. 2d 940 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
118. 194 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
119. Khademi, 1016 F. Supp. 2d at 1023, 1025-26; Burbridge, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 948-

HOUSTON CHRON.,

49. The same regulations were at issue in both cases.
120. Burbridge, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 948-49.
121. Id. at 943.

122. Id. at 953.
123. Khademi, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 1016.
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discretion" to allow groups to use amplified 2 4sound, to demonstrate outside the
preferred zones, and to utilize indoor facilities.
How would the hypothetical regulation from the Bayless case fare under a
challenge that it was not content-neutral? On the face of our hypothetical
regulation, 125 no expressive activity would be allowed except within the zone. It
would seem that if there is no discretion-if all requests to speak outside a zone
will be denied-then the university cannot fairly be said to hold unfettered
discretion; indeed, it has no discretion at all.' 26 This appears to have been the tactic
of the University of Houston in Pro-Life Cougarswhen it passed the second policy.
In our Bayless hypothetical, the regulation facially has no requirement that students
obtain a permit or receive permission to use the Student Expression Area, other
than requiring a reservation forty-eight hours in advance127 Because the regulation
appears to grant officials no discretion, and because a two-day notice requirement
is a reasonable method of preventing conflicts over limited space, the Bayless
regulation28 does not appear susceptible to challenge on content-neutrality
grounds.
2. Narrow Tailoring
Plaintiffs may also challenge university regulations on narrow tailoring
grounds. Although the requirement is often considered not to have much weight
after Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 29 federal courts nonetheless use this prong to
strike down speech zone restrictions. One such case involving a free speech zone in
a public forum comes from outside the university setting. Service Employee
International Union, Local 660 v. City of Los Angeles13 0 arose out of security
concerns surrounding the 2000 Democratic National Convention. The United States
Secret Service and the Los Angeles Police Department planned to wall off an eight
million square foot "secured zone" around the Staples Center, where the
convention was being held.' 3 ' Two hundred and sixty yards from the entrance to
32
the Staples Center, just outside the secured zone, a demonstration site was set up.'
There was no requirement that people stay inside the boundaries of the
demonstration site, but the regulation banned "expressive activity" inside the

124. ld. at 1023.
125. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
126. Cf.Young v. City of Simi Valley, 216 F.3d 807, 819 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that
because "officials have almost no discretion to deny a permit... it is not an unconstitutional
prior restraint").
127. See supra note 39 and text accompanying note 55.
128. See, e.g., United States v. McFadden, 71 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966 (W.D. Mo. 1999)
(finding a forty-eight-hour time limit for a permit was reasonable).
129. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
130. 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
131. Id. at 968. The Staples Center, located in downtown Los Angeles, is the home to
several professional sports teams, including the Los Angeles Lakers, Los Angeles Kings,
and Los Angeles Clippers. See http://www.staplescenter.com (last visited Jan. 27, 2004).
132. Serv. Employee int'l Union, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 968. The site was furnished with a
platform, a sound system, and bathroom facilities, and had a "sight line" to the Staples
Center. Id. at 969.
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secured zone.' 33 Several groups who wanted to leaflet, protest, make speeches, and
perform other expressive activities brought suit for a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the zone.' 34
In ruling on the motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court first
determined that the area covered by the security zone-encompassing public streets
and sidewalks-was a traditional public forum.' 35 Thus, the court subjected the
speech regulation to the time, place, or manner test to determine whether it was
content-neutral, narrowly tailored to a significant government interest, and whether
it offered adequate alternatives.' 36 The parties did not dispute the issue of contentneutrality. 137 The court found, however, that the zone was neither narrowly tailored,
nor did the demonstration area provide an adequate alternative.' 38 As to the
tailoring requirement, though the asserted interest of the government-protecting
the public and the delegates-was clearly significant, the restriction was
"substantially broader than necessary."' 139 The size of the secured zone-185
acres-was so large that it prevented anyone "with any message, positive or
negative, from getting within several hundred feet" of the delegates as they went in
and out of the convention center. 14 The secured zone covered much more space
than was necessary to allow safe entrance and exit to the building.' 41 In addition,
the restriction banned expressive activities at all times of day and night and started
three days before the convention, indicating to the court that the city made no
attempt to balance the requirements of security with the constitutional speech rights
of the protestors. 142 The court flatly stated that "banning speech is an unacceptable
means of planning for potential nisconduct." 4 3 The court, also finding that the

133. The regulation also banned any person without a ticket from the Democratic
National Convention Committee ("DNCC") or prior clearance from the Secret Service. Id. at
968-69.
134. Id. at 968.
135. Id. at 970.
136. Id.
137. Id. at n. 1. Even though the issue was not raised, the court expressed doubt that the
restrictions were in fact content-neutral because a ticket from the DNCC was required to
enter, and although "some Democrats will be denied access to the zone[,] ... all nondemocrats will be denied access." Id. (emphasis in original).
138. Id. at 971-73.
139. Id. at 971.
140. Id.
141. Id. The court noted that a complete "no-speech" zone properly tailored around
entrances and exits would be permissible to protect the delegates, and noted that the
protestors did not even attempt to seek access to the sidewalk area that actually surrounded
the convention site. Id. at n.3.
142. Id. at 971-72.
[T]he "manner" of speech is not addressed by the plan because the
intent is to preclude all speech activities by non-invitees within the
secured zone. Thus, there is again no attempt made to accommodate or
balance the speech interests of the protestors against the need for
security at the Convention site.
Id. at 972.
143. Id. Interestingly enough, the state's worries about potential misconduct became
reality. Though the protests were mostly peaceful, on the first night of the convention at a
site that would have been within the security zone, a few hundred protestors assaulted police
officers by throwing rocks and bottles. Mounted police dispersed the violent protestors with
rubber bullets and pepper spray. See Todd S. Purdum, The Democrats: The Protesters;
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44
demonstration zone was
granted the motion for a
45 an inadequate alternative,1
injunction.1
preliminary
Another speech zone case involving public forum speech restrictions arose in
the nation's capital. In Lederman v. United States, 46 a demonstration ban around
the U.S. Capitol building, instituted to reduce foot traffic and protect people on the
ground, was challenged. 147 The regulation defined some Capitol areas as "nodemonstration zones,"' 14 8 and other areas as zones where demonstrations were
allowed only with permits.149 Lederman was leafleting on the sidewalk in front of
the Senate side of the Capitol, within one of the "no-demonstration zones," when
police officers approached and told Lederman to leaflet in a designated lawn area
location 250 feet away.' 50 Lederman did not comply because he "believ[ed] that he
could not reach his intended audience from the lawn."'' l The police told him to
wait on the sidewalk in front of the House side of the Capitol (another "nodemonstration zone"), upon which
Lederman went right back to leafleting and was
52
arrested for violating the ban.
Lederman was acquitted of the criminal charges by the local court because that
court believed that the ban was unconstitutional. 1§3 He then sued in federal court to
challenge the ban's constitutionality. The D.C. Circuit found that the sidewalk
where Lederman was arrested was a traditional public forum, 54 as the entire
55
Capitol Grounds met the classic requirements of the traditional public forum.
Analyzing the "no-demonstration zone" under a time, place, or manner test, the
court focused on the narrow tailoring aspect' 56 and evaluated the restrictions using
several principles:

First, we closely scrutinize challenged speech restrictions to determine
if [they] indeed promote[] the Government's purposes in more than a
Police and Demonstrators Clash Outside Convention Hall, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2000, at

A15.

144. The portion of the opinion discussing adequate alternatives is discussed infra Part
I.C.3. See infra notes 169-97 and accompanying text.
145. Serv. Employee Int'l Union, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 974-75.
146. 291 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
147. Id. at 44. The ban affected "demonstration activity" defined as such:
Parading,

picketing,

leafleting,

holding

vigils,

sit-ins,

or other

expressive conduct or speechmaking that conveys a message supporting
or opposing a point of view and has the intent, effect or propensity to
attract a crowd or onlookers, but does not include merely wearing Tee
shirts, buttons, or other similar articles of apparel that convey a
message.
Id. at 39.
148. Id.

149. Id.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 41. The court chose not to address the constitutionality of the other no-

speech zones around the Capitol. Id.
155. Id. The Capitol Grounds "have traditionally been open to the public, and their
intended use is consistent with public expression." Id. at 41.
156. Id. at 44. The court ruled on this issue and did not reach the adequate alternative
prong also raised by the appellant. ld.
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speculative way. Second, per se bans on expressive conduct are
inherently suspect. Third, while the Government must be afforded a
reasonable measure of discretion in determining how best to promote its
identified interests, the Constitution does not tolerate regulations that,
while serving their purported aims, prohibit a wide range of activities
that do not interfere with the Government's objectives. Fourth, [tihe fact
that a substantially less restrictive regulation [would] be equally
effective in promoting the same ends may be relevant to the
constitutional analysis. 157
The court found that the ban promoted the government's purposes, but noted
that it "imposes precisely the sort of 'total' restriction on certain types of speech
that the Supreme Court [has] 'questioned.""15 8 The speech zone regulation allowed
some types of speech, but the court held that this was relevant only for "ample
alternatives" analysis and not to the narrow tailoring requirement.159 The court
noted that not all of the types of expressive activity banned could advance the
government's purposes, 16 and that the "ready availability of 'substantially less
restrictive' alternatives" would be as effective in "promot[ing] safety and orderly
traffic flow.'' 16 1 For instance, the Capitol Police could enforce existing laws barring
"disruptive conduct" and "obstructing . . . passage" outside the Capitol. 162 The
court also suggested that a permit system could be used to limit the number and
length of demonstrations, restrict the size of demonstrations, and so forth. 63 The
D.C. Circuit found that the ban "impose[d] a serious loss to speech . . . for a
disproportionately small government gain" and thus failed the narrow tailoring
prong of the time, place, or manner test. 64
The applicability of these cases to free speech zones on university campuses is
apparent. If the court considers the grounds of a university a public forum, a
complete ban on certain types of expressive activity in large portions of those
grounds could fail the narrow tailoring requirement. There is no question that the
first part of the test is met-maintaining order on campus is a significant, if not
compelling, state interest. 165 And a regulation that bans demonstrations and other
kinds of expressive activity is more likely to prevent disorder than no regulation at
all. 16 6 However, the plaintiffs may still challenge the policy as being substantially

157. Id. (alterations in original) (citations and quotations omitted).
158. Id. at 45.
159. Id.
160. Id. ("For example, a single leafleteer standing on the East Front sidewalk will no
more likely block traffic or threaten security than will photographers, star-struck tourists,
and landscape painters complete with easels, but the Board has made no effort to keep any of
these latter individuals away from the Capitol.").
161. Id. (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Kerrigan, 865 F.2d 382, 390
(D.C. Cir. 1989)).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 46. The court noted that it was just giving examples, and that not all of its
suggestions might be upheld as constitutional. Id.
164. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
165. See Ala. Student Party v. Student Gov't Ass'n, 867 F.2d 1344, 1352 (1lth Cir.
1989) ("A university's interest in furthering its educational mission, if reasonable in scope,
may be a 'compelling state interest."') (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5
(1981)).
166. That is, the regulation would meet the post-Ward narrow tailoring requirement.
See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
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overbroad. As the size of the free speech zones shrink or the amount of expressive
activity regulated grows, so too grows the potential argument that a university is
curtailing substantially more speech than necessary in the quest to maintain order
on campus.
Applied to the hypothetical regulation in Bayless, it would seem that a narrow
tailoring challenge might be successful. The regulation as modified would allow
demonstrations for three hours a day in one area of the campus. 67 On a sprawling
campus, a regulation limiting speech to an area this small might fail a narrow
tailoring challenge because it covers substantially more ground 168 or covers more
time' 69 than is necessary to avoid likely disruptions that would interfere with the
operation of the university. Such a place restriction also fails to make any
distinction between the inherent disruptiveness of different forms of expressive
activity. A silent handbiller, a single speechmaker, a small cadre of picketers, or
demonstrators using amplifiers are all precluded from speaking outside the speech
zone, even though the risk of disruption to the university's mission posed by each
of these speakers is obviously different. The combination of excluding expressive
activity from areas that are appropriate for speech, and a lack of differentiation
between the risk of different modes of speech, might convince a court that a free
speech zone has not been tailored and restricts far more speech than is needed to
protect the university's mission. Additionally, a plaintiff could also point to the
availability of other methods to control disruption, such as detailed manner
regulations, that could just as effectively prevent disruption to the mission of the
university while allowing as much speech as is possible. A regulation like the one
in the hypothetical, which limits speech to only one area on campus, presents a
very promising argument for constitutional invalidity. In fact, both the majority
opinion and the concurrence in Bayless strongly imply that if the actual Bayless
regulation
were read as restrictive, it would have been unconstitutional for this very
170
reason.
Again, the particulars of any speech zone regulation will vary. However, it
should be apparent that, if the grounds of the university are considered a public
forum, the persuasiveness of the lack of narrow tailoring argument is directly
proportional to the ratio of open space to the size of the zone. The larger the
campus and the smaller the speech zone, the higher the ratio will be. The higher the
ratio, the more likely the regulation is "substantially broader than necessary."
3. Adequate Alternatives
The third potential avenue available to challenge a public forum speech
restriction is to argue that the restriction fails to leave adequate alternatives for
speech. Courts have found free speech zones unconstitutional on this ground. In
Service Employee International Union, Local 660 v. City of Los Angeles, 17 1 the
district court found that the speech zone restrictions around the Staples Center in
Los Angeles left inadequate alternatives for speech. 172 Noting that political speech
167. See notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
168. Such as areas far away from classrooms or other campus buildings.
169. Such as weekends.
170. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
171. Serv. Employee Int'l Union, Local 660 v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d
966, 972 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
172. See supra notes 128-143 and accompanying text.
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directed at delegates to the Democratic Party's presidential nominating convention
"rest[ed] at the very core of the First Amendment," the court found that the zone
effectively prevented that speech from being heard. 173 The demonstration zone was
far from the convention center and was separated from the center by a "media
village" filled with large equipment. 74 This made it unlikely that the intended
audience-the delegates-would be able to see or hear the protestors.175 This made
the zone unconstitutional. 176 The court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary
injunction, holding that "[a]ny scheme that precludes plaintiffs from effectively
' 77
communicating with those delegates will not withstand constitutional scrutiny.'
A successful adequate alternatives challenge has also been brought against a
public university speech zone. In Students Against Apartheid Coalition v.

0'Neil, 7 1 anti-apartheid student protestors sought to convince the University of
Virginia Board of Visitors to divest from companies doing business in South
Africa. 179 They built symbolic wooden shanties on a centrally located area on
campus known as "the Lawn"' 180 within sight of the Rotunda building where the
Board was meeting.' 8' The university reacted to this protest by creating a "lawn
use" policy that banned "structures" on the portion of the Lawn visible from the
Rotunda while allowing all other forms of protest. 8 2 The stated purpose of the
regulation was to protect the aesthetic beauty of the lawn. 8 3 The university
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 972-73. "In short, at this crucial political event, those who do not possess a
ticket to the convention cannot get close enough to the facility to be seen or heard. The First
Amendment does not permit such a result." Id. at 972. The court noted that the other
boundaries of the zone were permissible. Id.
177. Id. at 973, 975. The Ninth Circuit seems to be especially generous to claims of
inadequate alternatives involving protest zones and buffer zones. Also interesting is that
there seems to be a lot of this activity occurring in San Francisco. For instance, in Bay Area
Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 1990), the "Peace Navy,"
consisting of people on small boats, wanted to advance their anti-military message to people
watching a naval parade from a pier in San Francisco Bay. The Navy instituted a seventyfive yard buffer zone around the pier. Id. at 1226. Sound amplification was also restricted.
Id. at 1229. Because the Peace Navy could not be seen or heard by its intended audience, the
court affirmed a permanent injunction against enforcing the zone. Id. at 1225-26, 1229.
Similarly, in United States v. Baugh, 187 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999), the court
overturned the convictions of protestors who had demonstrated without a permit at the
Presidio in San Francisco based on a lack of adequate alternatives. The court found that the
"First Amendment area" ignored by the protestors was too far away from the protestors'
intended audience, the Park Service Visitors Center. Id. The court found the protest zone
inadequate even though, as suggested by the concurrence, "[t]he First Amendment area was
not Siberia. It was located only 150 yards or so away, and in view of, the Visitors Center."
Id. at 1045 (Silverman, J., concurring).
178. 660 F. Supp. 333 (W.D. Va. 1987).
179. Id. at 335.
180. "The Lawn" and surrounding areas consists of "colonnades, pavilions... and the
open grassy area between them." Id. The area, considered an architectural masterpiece, was
designed by Thomas Jefferson and is both a National Historic Landmark and on the World
Heritage List. Id. For maps and photographs of the Lawn, see http://www.virginia.edu/art/
Lawntour/Welcome.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2004).
181. Students Against Apartheid Coalition,660 F. Supp. at 337.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 335.
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suggested alternative sites where shanties
84 could be built, but students challenged
the policy on First Amendment grounds.1
The district court held that the regulation was unconstitutional. First, the court
noted that the regulation was vague, 18 and found an "insufficient nexus" between
the restriction and the interest asserted. 186 The court, likening the Lawn to "a
traditional public forum like [a] municipal park[]," then applied the time, place, or
manner test.18 7 The court found that the regulation left protestors without adequate
alternatives for expression.' 8 8 The alternative building sites were inadequate as they
were infrequently traveled and outside of "earshot or clear sight" of the delegates
inside the Rotunda. 189 Use of the mails and mass media were also inadequate, as
they were more expensive, less likely to reach the intended audience, and less
effective in presenting the student's message than the image of shanties on a
pristine lawn. 19° Without adequate alternatives to the lawn expression, the
regulations could not satisfy the time, place, or manner test. 191 The university later
revised the policy. 192 The vague language of the regulation was tightened and the
policy was modified to prevent the building only of those structures that
"interrupt[ed] the architectural lines of the historic area" on the south side of the
Rotunda. 193 This policy was upheld as constitutional as it allowed shanties to be
built in other high traffic94areas surrounding the Rotunda, satisfying the adequate
alternatives requirement. 1
While a lack of adequate alternatives is a potential basis for a First
Amendment speech zone challenge, it suffers from some practical complications.
To illustrate, consider the free speech zone described in Bayless. 195 The speech
zone is centrally located and surrounded by campus buildings. This area is
presumably high traffic. For speech that is not directed towards any particular
audience, this speech zone is adequate, if not optimal, for reaching the largest
audience possible. To challenge this policy on adequate alternative grounds would
184. Id. at 337.
185. Id. at 335. The policy used, but did not define, the terms "structure" or "extended
presence." Id. at 339. The term "extended presence" was "particularly... vague." Id.
186. It is unlikely that the regulation could be found unconstitutional on this ground
today. This case predated Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799-800 (1989),
which modified the narrow tailoring requirement to require only that the interest be
advanced more so than it would be without the regulation, so long as the regulation is not
"substantially broader than necessary" to meet that goal. See supra notes 84-86 and
accompanying text.
187. Students Against Apartheid Coalition, 660 F. Supp. at 338 (citations omitted).
" his case involves the central lawn of a large university. Mindful of the traditional role of
the university as an invaluable marketplace of ideas, and the similarity between an open
campus lawn and a traditional public forum like municipal parks," the court held that it
would use the time, place, or manner test for a public forum. Id. at 338 (citations omitted).
188. Id. at 339-40.
189. Id. at 340.

190. Id. ("[TIhe Board of Visitors ...may not deliberately be seeking information
about apartheid, and [using other methods] might be less effective for delivering the message
that is conveyed by the sight of a shanty in front of the Rotunda.").
191. Id.
192. Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil ("SAAC I'), 671 F. Supp. 1105,
1106 (W.D. Va. 1987), aff'dper curiam, 838 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1988).
193. Id. at 1107.
194. Id.
195. See supra Part I.B; supra notes 39, 56-57 and accompanying text.
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require arguing that the university is not providing ample alternatives for speech,
because it only allows speech at the heart of the university. This is absurd.
Conversely, if a university placed its speech zones in peripheral, low traffic areas
of the campus, an adequate alternatives argument might prove successful. The
likelihood of success will turn on a question of degree: how much has the audience
been reduced? The mere fact that the expression can reach more people in an
alternate location does not make a free speech zone inadequate, so the successful
challenger would need to show that the audience accessible from the speech zone is
so reduced as to be inadequate.196
Another practical difficulty with the adequate alternatives challenge arises
where students wish to speak to a particular audience that cannot be reached from
the speech zone. Imagine that student protesters in Bayless want to protest the
firing of the school's basketball coach outside the athletics department, which is a
mile from the central speech zone. Any challenge in this case would likely be an
"as-applied" challenge; 197 that is, the zone is unconstitutional as applied to the
basketball protestors because the zone is too far from the athletics department for
the protestors to have their message heard. An as-applied challenge is problematic
for purposes of eliminating a free speech zone because even if the plaintiffs win,
the speech zone will remain intact for everyone else. In order to strike the speech
zone for all student groups, the plaintiffs would have to argue that the statute was
facially unconstitutional-unconstitutional in all its applications. 198 For the reasons
stated in the previous paragraph, this argument is not likely to win. The central
speech zone is most likely adequate for most speakers, particularly those wishing to
reach the world in general, and is therefore constitutional to those speakers. For the
same reasons, an "overbreadth" challenge to the regulation by speakers who do
have adequate alternatives is unlikely to be successful. 199
To completely strike a free speech restriction on adequate alternatives grounds,
the regulation at issue will probably be more similar to the one in Students Against
Apartheid Coalition. There, the campus was generally open to speech with one
small area designated off limits to one particular form of protest. There, the only
group affected by the regulation challenged it, and if it could not be applied to the
shanty protestors it would never be applied at all. The challenge there effectively
destroyed the zone. This is not the situation with the typical speech zone regulation.
There, the majority of the campus is designated as no-protest with only small areas
permitting speech. In the free speech zone case, an adequate alternatives challenge
196. Cf Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802 (1989) ("[The fact that] the
city's limitations .. .may reduce to some degree the potential audience for respondent's
speech is of no consequence, for there has been no showing that the remaining avenues of
communication are inadequate.").
197. See 16 Am.Ju. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 140, 545 n.83 (1998) ("[A]n 'as applied
challenge' . . . argues that a statute, even though generally constitutional, operates
unconstitutionally as to the plaintiff because of his peculiar circumstances.") (citing Texas
Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 518 n.16 (Tex. 1995)).
198. "[A] 'facial challenge' to a law is a challenge based on a contention that the law,
by its own terms, always operates unconstitutionally." Id. at § 140.
199. When a speech restriction can be legally enforced against a speaker, the
overbreadth doctrine allows that speaker to bring a challenge to the law anyway. That
speaker can prevail and have the law found unconstitutional in full, if "the statute is
'substantially' overbroad, which requires the court to find a realistic danger that the statute
itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not
before the court." 16A AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 411 (1998).
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would likely carve out a niche in the no-speech area while leaving the overall
speech zone structure intact. Still, such challenges could be useful in making sure
that any speech zone policy allowed protests in crucial campus areas. For instance,
an as-applied challenge could lift a speech zone restriction outside administration
buildings for students who wished to be heard on issues directly affecting them as
students. This piecemeal approach may be useful if not completely satisfactory.
III. THE UNIVERSITY AS A NoNPuBLic FORUM
A. Can the University be Considereda Nonpublic Forum?
Until this point, this Note has assumed that university campus grounds would
be considered a public forum as to its students. However, if a university were able
to successfully argue that its campus was a nonpublic forum, the time, place, or
manner test would be replaced by the even lesser standard of "reasonableness" as a
gauge of its constitutionality. 200 Is it possible to consider the university a nonpublic
forum? The one main obstacle to such an effort is that, as noted, 20' the geographical
and physical realities of most campuses will include areas that can be considered
traditional public fora.20 2 Public streets and sidewalks cross through universities,
parks. All of these areas are usually
and open areas at many universities resemble
24
20 3
However, in United States v. Kokinda
considered traditional public forums.
the Supreme Court ruled that not all sidewalks are traditional public forums.
Essentially, if a classic traditional public forum has a "sufficiently 'specialized"'
use, then it may not be a public forum after all. 205 The question of whether
otherwise traditional public fora on university campuses are specialized enough to
strip them of their public forum status is beyond the scope of this Note but has
recently been the subject of other scholarly work. 206 Assuming that the campus
grounds could be considered a nonpublic forum, what might such a challenge to the
free speech zone regulation look like? The issue will be discussed below.
B. A Guidepostfor the Speech Zone Challenge Under Nonpublic Forum Doctrine?:
Auburn Alliance for Peace & Justice v. Martin
One possible guidepost for what a speech zone challenge in a non-public
forum regime might look like comes from Auburn University in 1988. In Auburn
27
Alliance for Peace & Justice v. Martin, 0 a group of students and faculty (the
Alliance) at Auburn University wanted to hold a weeklong camp-out on university

200. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
201. See Smolla, supra note 28.
202. As some courts have already done. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
203. See supra Part I.A.
204. 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
205. See Lederman v. United States, 291 F.3d 36, 41-44 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (explaining
Kokinda and other cases, but then finding that the sidewalk around the U.S. Capitol building
was not sufficiently specialized to remove its traditional public forum status).
206. See McDonald, supra note 61. McDonald discusses this issue as it relates to public
universities through analysis of a Fifth Circuit case from 2002, Bristerv. Faulkner,214 F.3d
675 (5 t" Cir. 2000), dealing with the question of whether the sidewalk in front of a university
amphitheater was a public forum. Id. at 476-77. She also analyzes similar decisions in other
circuits. Id. at 484-91.
207. 684 F. Supp. 1072 (M.D. Ala. 1988).
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grounds to protest foreign policy in Central America. 20 8 The university had
regulations for speeches and demonstrations that allowed such speech only in the
"Open Air Forum" and only between 11:00 A.M. and 2:00 P.M. each day, absent
prior approval of the university. 2 9 The Alliance sought such approval and, after an
initial denial, was granted an exception allowing use of the Open Air Forum for
several additional hours each day. 210 Additionally, the university offered the

208. Id. at 1073.
209. The regulations read as follows:
Auburn University recognizes and supports the rights of students,
employees of all categories, and visitors to speak and demonstrate in a
lawful manner in designated areas of the campus. In order to maintain
campus safety, security, and order, and to insure the orderly scheduling
of facilities and to preclude conflicts with academic and co-curricular
activities, Auburn University reserves the right to reasonably limit such
activities by the following regulations regarding the time, place, and
manner of such activities. These regulations shall be known as the
Auburn University Speech Regulations.
A. Administration

These regulations shall be administered by the Office of Student
Affairs.
B. Definitions
1. Speech, as used in this document, is the oral presentation of ideas
in an open forum.
2. A demonstration shall be any process of showing individual or
group cause by reasoning, by use of example, by group action, or by
other forms of public explanation.
C. Time, Place and Manner Limitations for Speeches and
Demonstrations

1. Interior
Demonstrations, debates and speeches may be held inside University
facilities only in compliance with established procedures for the use of
the facility.
2. Exterior

a. Auburn University reserves the right to require that speakers,
scheduled and unscheduled, sponsored and unsponsored, University
affiliated, and visitors to campus, move to the Open Air Forum or to
another location to avoid unreasonable conflict with the missions of the
University and to assure that the flow of vehicular and pedestrian traffic
will not be impeded. The use of the Open Air Forum is scheduled by the
Office of the Director of Foy Union, for use between the hours of 11:00
a.m. and 2:00 p.m.
The use of the Open Air Forum is to be scheduled in blocks of
time, so as to encourage the accommodation of all users and to
discourage the monopolization of the Open Air Forum by any person,
agency, or organization. Demonstrations, speeches, and debates will be
held only in the Open Air Forum unless special authorization is secured
through the Office of Student Affairs not less than 48 hours in advance.
This authorization will require identification of the organization and
agreement to abide by reasonable Auburn University regulations, and
will not be unreasonably withheld.
Id. at 1073-74.
210. The University gave permission to use the forum from 9:00 A.M. to 4:30 P.M. on
weekdays and 11:00 A.M. to 4:30 P.M. on weekends. Id. at 1074.
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protestors an alternative site, on the concrete outside Memorial Coliseum, 21 1for all
other hours of the day when the Open Air Forum was unavailable. 212 The protestors
did not believe they could transmit their message as effectively from the coliseum,
and started a camp-out outside of hours in the Open Air Forum despite the
regulations. 213 The demonstration was not disruptive, but during the first night of
the protest, campus police told the demonstrators to leave, taking the identification
of those who refused.214 Later those students were reprimanded.2t 5
The Alliance sued the university, claiming that the refusal to grant twenty-four
hour-a-day access to the Open Air Forum specifically, and the regulations
generally, were unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment.2 16 The
district court disagreed. Applying the standard time, place, or manner test, 2 17 the
court found that, as applied to the Alliance, the restriction on the use of the Open
Air Forum was content-neutral and that there was no proof of intent to discriminate
against the Alliance's viewpoint. 218 The court seemed to find narrow tailoring in
the university's extending the hours for using the Open Air Forum and granting an
alternative location. 219 The adequate alternatives prong was satisfied as well. The
court intimated that the purposes of the camp-out were not "particularly
expressive," and in any case, less expressive
than the camp-out in Clark v.
220
Community for Creative Non-Violence, in which the Supreme Court
held that
221
restrictions on camping did not bar alternative methods of expression.
The court next addressed whether the regulations were vague and overbroad.222
The court stated at the outset that they were not vague: no speech or demonstrations
anywhere on campus without prior authorization, except in the Open Air Forum at
stated times.223 The court then found that the regulations were aimed at speech
activities that "a reasonable person might find disruptive, or might ... interfere
with normal activities on campus" under both a plain interpretation of, and the
university's actual application of, the regulations. 224 The university's power to
move student speech outside the Open Air Forum based on interference with "the
missions of the University" was held to mean that the university could move
211. Memorial Coliseum, now known as Beard-Eaves-Memorial Coliseum, is Auburn's
basketball arena. See http://www.aubumtigers.com/mensbasketballpage.cfm?docid=343
(last visited Jan. 27, 2004).
212. Auburn Alliance, 684 F. Supp. at 1074.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1075.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1072-73.
217. Id. at 1077 (citing the test as it appears in Clark v. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984)).
218. The actions of the university in attempting to accommodate the weeklong campout served to disprove this point conclusively in the court's view. Id. at 1076.
219. The court noted in light of the nature of this demonstration, which did not include
speeches and was not disruptive, the University "wisely" extended the hours for use of the
public forum, while still balancing the rights of these students against the others on campus.
See id. at 1077.
220. 468 U.S. 288 (1984). The camp-out in Clark was tied to the reality of homeless
people being forced to sleep outdoors. See id. at 295-96.
221. See Auburn Alliance, 684 F. Supp. at 1077 & n.2.
222. Id. at 1077-78.
223. Id. at 1078.
224. Id. This is similar to how a regulation that seems to grant "unbridled discretion"
may be read as containing limits on that discretion. Cf supra notes 79-83.
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students based on the listed criteria: maintaining "'campus safety, security, and
order .
' "securing
"..
'the orderly scheduling of facilities' and "'preclud[ing]
conflicts with academic and co-curricular activities." 225 In light of this reading, the
court stated that "[t]he University can not prevent speeches and demonstrations
unless the requested speech or demonstration would unduly interfere with the
criteria listed in the regulation, and such authorization 'will not be unreasonably
withheld.' 226 The Auburn speech regulations were thus upheld.227
What is uncertain about Auburn Alliance is how the court classified the areas
of the campus outside of the Open Air Forum. The only mention of public forum
doctrine was the finding that the Open Air Forum was the school's "designated
Public Forum., 228 This does not necessarily mean that the other areas of the
campus are nonpublic fora, but the language of the opinion lends strong support to
that notion. The opinion limits its analysis of the time, place, or manner test to the
"[r]estrictions imposed on [P]laintiffs' use of the Forum."22 9 The judicial
construction of the regulations as a whole, including the areas outside the Open Air
Forum, were assessed as whether they are reasonable in light of the "mission of the
University"-just as the nonpublic forum doctrine requires speech restrictions to be
"reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves.
The district
court's construction of the speech regulations as being limited to those reasonable
in light of the university's mission, seems tied to that court's earlier reading of the
now-familiar footnote five of Widmar.23'
The court's reading of the Auburn regulation perhaps illustrates some outer
limits of the university's ability to restrict speech on campus. Restrictions on
speech in a nonpublic forum must be reasonable in relation to the purpose of the
forum. 232 If a college campus is a non-public forum, then to some extent, the
mission statement of the university should be used to set that purpose. This was
exactly what the court did in Auburn Alliance.233 However, the ability of the
university to restrict speech by promulgating a narrow mission statement seems to
be limited by the holding in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,234 which involved events occurring in what is clearly a nonpublic forum: a

225. Auburn Alliance, 684 F. Supp. at 1078 (quoting the student regulations at issue).
226. Interference with "campus safety, security and order .... orderly scheduling of
facilities and to preclude conflicts with academic and extracurricular activities." Id. at 1072.
227. Id. at 1078.
228. Id. at 1072.
229. Id. at 1076.
230. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983).
231. The court in Auburn Alliance parenthetically summed up the footnote as meaning
that "a university may regulate the time, place and manner of expressive activity so that it
does not materially disrupt classwork, involve substantial disorder on campus, or invade the
rights of others." Auburn Alliance, 684 F. Supp. at 1077.
232. PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 49.
233. See Auburn Alliance, 684 F. Supp. at 1078 ("'[T~he missions of the University' is
a broad criterion, the evidence before the Court indicates that the University has interpreted
this criterion to limit speeches and demonstrations which disrupt classes, dormitory life,
campus security, and the other criteria listed in the Speech Regulations.").
234. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). For an example of how Tinker might limit the university's
ability to curtail speech, see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1981) ('The
University's institutional mission, which it describes as providing a 'secular education' to its
students . . . does not exempt its actions from constitutional scrutiny. . . . [T]he First
Amendment rights of speech and association extend to the campuses of state universities.")
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classroom in session.235 In Tinker, the Supreme Court upheld the right of high
school students to wear black arbands in class as a show of protest against the
Vietnam War.236 If minor high school students "on the campus during the
authorized hours" have free speech rights inside their nonpublic forum so long as
they do not "materially disrupt[] classwork or involve[] substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others ' 237 then a fortiori those same rights must extend to
adult college students on the university campus. But these rights might not go too
far. The expression in Tinker was aimed at suppressing speech-a content-based
restriction. 23 Restricting time, place, and manner of speech that was disruptive was
expressly permitted. 239 However, the Tinker formulation can be seen as setting a
minimum. For any speech zone, the question should be whether or not the speech
zone is reasonable in light of the university's valid goal of preventing "material[]
disrupt[ion of] classwork... [,] substantial disorder[,] or invasion of the rights of
others. '240 This still will likely not result in many successful challenges. First,
"[tihe Government's decision to restrict access to a nonpublic forum need only be
reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation.",24 1
Additionally, in the nonpublic forum there is no narrow tailoring requirement, and
as-applied challenges under inadequate alternatives theory will be marginally
useful at best.242
In practical terms for free speech zone challengers in the nonpublic forum
arena, it means they will probably not win, absent a truly egregious policy. Even
though a place restriction is overbroad 243 and targeting disruptive behavior directly
would be less speech restrictive, the fact that targeting disruptive behavior is more

(citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) and Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972)) (emphasis in original).
The viability of Tinker with regards to student speech at the high-school level and
below is possibly threatened due to recent cases. For a more thorough discussion of Tinker
and its progeny, see Andrew D.M. Miller, Balancing School Authority and Student
Expression, 54 BAYLOR L. REv. 623 (2002).

235. See, e.g., May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 787 F.2d 1105, 1114 (7th
Cir. 1986) (elementary school classroom is a nonpublic forum); Muller by Muller v.
Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1539-40 (7th Cir. 1996) (elementary school is a
nonpublic forum); Murray v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., 919 F. Supp. 838, 1112 (W.D.
Pa. 1996) (high school classroom is a nonpublic forum).
236. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
237. Id. at 512-13.
238. Id. at 504.
239. "[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason-whetherit
stems from time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves

substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
240. Id.

241. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808 (1985)
(emphasis in original).
242. '"he First Amendment does not demand unrestricted access to a nonpublic forum
merely because use of that forum may be the most efficient means of delivering the speaker's
message. Rarely will a nonpublic forum provide the only means of contact with a particular
audience." Id. at 809 (citations omitted).
243. Because not all potential speakers in that space would be disruptive, but all would
be banned.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.79:267

reasonable does not make it mandatory. 2" Certainly it is administratively easier to
deny access instead of making case-by-case determinations of disruptiveness or
monitoring of all events for signs of disruption. Additionally, the creation of a free
speech zone-here, opening a designated public forum-could very possibly save
the nonpublic forum campus speech restrictions. As in Auburn Alliance, the
university's creation of a designated speech zone may be considered an attempt to
accommodate students who have demonstrated that their actions will be nondisruptive. The issue of reasonableness cannot, of course, be divorced from the
facts of a case. However, it is hard to imagine a university creating and supporting
a free speech zone policy so restrictive that it would lose if its campus were
considered a nonpublic forum. For this reason, it is likely crucial that any challenge
to free speech zones establish that the university grounds in question are public
forums.
IV. Non-Legal Alternatives?
This Note has thus far explored various legal challenges to free speech zones.
In light of their unpopularity, might there be a different approach to bringing down
speech zones? It is possible that student outrage and public pressure could act more
swiftly than the courts to change overly restrictive speech regulations. However,
the author believes that universities will not ordinarily respond to mere student
pressure. The existence of the free speech zones themselves may serve as a
practical impediment to pressuring a university to change its policies; after all, how
many students will protest in front of an administration building if they can be
expelled for doing so? Sadly, anecdotal evidence shows that universities tend to
change their policies only when sued.245
Legal challenges hold considerably more promise. Initially, it is important to
remember that universities certainly have the ability to craft free speech policies
that will withstand constitutional scrutiny under the public forum doctrine.
However, it might not be worth the university's effort. Legal challenges to
university speech zones have the potential to succeed even when a zone is arguably
constitutional. The constitutionality of a speech zone is not ensured until it is
successfully defended, and therein lays the trouble. The inherent risk to the
university is that it will be forced to pay a student's attorneys fees after its carefully
drafted speech zone regulation is declared unconstitutional in a § 1983 lawsuit.2 46
In times of limited university budgets and massive state deficits, the risk of being
wrong is even more pronounced.
The West Virginia University policy shift late in 2002 is a paradigmatic
example of a university bowing to public pressure only when sued. The
university's controversial speech zone policy expressly limited student expression

244. In fact, there is support for the proposition that a preemptive place restriction is
perfectly reasonable. See id. at 810 ("[T]he Government need not wait until havoc is

wreaked to restrict access to a nonpublic forum.").
245. See supra, notes 1, 90-114. See also Campuses Under Fire over its 'Free-speech
Zones', CHI. TRIB., June 3, 2003, at 36 (noting examples of speech zones dropped due to
pending litigation).
246. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) allows civil lawsuits against state agencies (e.g., public
universities) that deprive persons of constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000) allows
prevailing parties under § 1983 to recover attorney's fees from the state.
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to two areas on campus.

247

These zones were "described by members of the

university as being 'roughly the size of a classroom"' and only "about 50 people
could fit in one zone while a little more than 100 could fit in the other." 248 Student
protests led the university to make some modifications, but the university defended
249
the general policy and retained the zone restriction as the policy's central feature.
However, under legal pressure after being sued by the civil libertarian Rutherford
Institute on behalf of students, the university dropped the speech zones altogether.
250 In an amazing turnabout, the university called their regulation
"an admittedly
outdated and flawed policy."25 I West Virginia University later instituted a new

policy to curb disruptive speech that did not use speech zones of any kind. That
policy allows speech activities on "any grounds on the campus outside of
buildings" 252 subject to nine 5 time,
place, and manner restrictions targeting
3
disruptive activities themselves.

247. The WVU Policy, archived at http://www.thefire.orglissues/policy_031802.php3
(last visited Jan. 7, 2004), read as follows:
Free Speech Activities, Policy on:
West Virginia University recognizes the right of individuals to
pursue their constitutional right of free speech and assembly, and
welcomes open dialogue as an opportunity to expand the educational
opportunities of our campus community. Individuals or organizations
may utilize designated free speech areas on a first-come, first-served
basis without making reservations.
The free expression of views or opinions, either by individuals or
groups, may not violate any rights of others, disrupt the normal function
of the university, or violate the provisions specified in the University
Code of Student Conduct. Solicitation is not permitted.
The University reserves the right to relocate or cancel the activity
due to disruption from excessive noise levels, traffic entanglement, or if

the safety of individuals is in question. Due to the limitations of space
on the downtown campus, the two designated areas for free speech and
assembly will be the amphitheater area of the Mountainlair plaza and
the concrete stage area in front of the Mountainlair and adjacent to the
WVU Bookstore.
248. Jonathan V. Last, In the Zone: At West Virginia University You Can Say Anything
You Want-As Long As You're Standing in the Free-Speech Zone, THE WKLY. STANDARD,
March 25, 2002.
249. See Josh Hafenbrack, Protest Freedoms Reviewed; WVU President Calls
Regulations 'PracticalNecessity', CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, June 14, 2002, at 1A,Kershaw,
supra note 7.
250. See Ellen Sorokin, WVU Eases Campus-Speech Rules; Public Protests No Longer
Limited to Designated 'Zones', THE WASH. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2002, at A08; Press Release, The
Rutherford Institute, The Rutherford Institute Claims First Amendment Victory in West
Virginia University 'Free Speech Zone' Case (Nov. 8, 2002) (on file with author), available
at http://rutherford.orglarticles-db/pressrelease.asp?article_id=335 (last visited Jan. 27,
2004).

251. Press Release, West Virginia University, WVU to Follow New Interim Policy on
Free Speech While Regional Campuses, Governing Board Ponder Further Improvements
(Jan. 27, 2004) (on file with author), available at http://www.nis.wvu.edu/2002_Releases/
RevisedFSP.htm.
252. West Virginia University, Policy Regarding Freedom of Expression and Use of
Facilities at West Virginia University and Regional Campuses §§ 3.3-3.4, available at

http:// www.wvu.edu/freespeechpolicy.html/#Policy (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
253. The restrictions:
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Since the original draft of this Note, another civil liberties organization, the
Foundation for Individual Rights in Education ("FIRE"), has declared a policy of
instituting lawsuits against university free speech zones.2M In April 2003, the FIRE
sued Shippenburg University in Pennsylvania after the university instituted "a
policy limiting demonstrations and rallies to two specific 'speech zones' on
campus." 255 In May 2003, the FIRE announced its intent to sue California's Citrus
Community College over free speech zones described as constituting only one
percent of that college's campus.256 The community college quickly capitulated:
"[A] day before college officials were to appear in court, they rescinded the speechrelated policies." 257 In June 2003, the FIRE sued Texas Tech over a policy that
258
required permission for speech activities everywhere on campus save for a small
"Free Speech Gazebo."5 9 It is clear that civil liberties groups such as the FIRE and

Attempt or actually interfere with, impair or impede the
institution's regularly scheduled classes, events, ceremonies
or normal and essential operations.
Interfere with, impede or cause blockage of the flow of
5.2.2
vehicular or pedestrian traffic.
Interfere with, impede or cause blockage of ingress or egress
5.2.3
to or from any building.
Willfully, negligently or recklessly commit any act likely to
5.2.4
create an imminent health or safety hazard.
Interfere with a University event by blocking audience view,
5.2.5
make sufficient noise to hamper a speaker or performance
from being heard or perform any other act disruptive to the
event.
Leave an area littered.
5.2.6
5.2.7
Use voice or amplification systems resulting in noise levels
that interfere with regularly scheduled classes, campus events
or operations or interfere with sleep between 10 p.m. and 7:30
a.m. at the residence halls.
Willfully, negligently or recklessly engage in destruction of
5.2.8
property or physical harm to others.
5.2.9
Within 75 feet of the entrance to any campus health care
facility, knowingly approach within 8 feet of another person
in order to pass a leaflet or handbill, display a sign, or engage
in oral protest, education, symbolic speech or counseling with
that person, without that person's consent.
Id. at §§ 5.2.1-5.2.9. The final restriction is a slightly modified version of the statute upheld
as constitutional by the Supreme Court in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707-08 (2000).
5.2.1

See supra note 87.
254. Tamar Lewin, Suit Challenges a University's Speech Code, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 24,

2003, at A25.
255. Id.
256. Mary Beth Marklein, Campuses on Opposite End of Free-Speech Struggles, USA

May 20, 2003 at IA.
257. Citrus College Dodges Court Date by DroppingSpeech Code, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC., June 27, 2003, at 30.
258. The free speech zone here is so small that it must be seen to be believed. An image
is available at http://www.thefire.orglimages/tt-gazebol.jpg (last visited Jan. 27, 2004).
TODAY,

259. Tracie Dungan, Campuses Put Limits on Speech; Balance of Order, Freedom
Sought, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETtE, July 13, 2003, at 19.
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the ACLU 260 understand that legal persuasion and not student persuasion will be
most instrumental in challenging university speech zones.
CONCLUSION

Place restrictions on student speech are a terrible idea. Certainly there is a need
to maintain order on college campuses, and certainly some speakers go too far and
cause disruption. More often than not, however, the disruption is not caused by the
location of the speech but rather by the actions of the speaker. Unless the harm to
be prevented by a place restriction relates to physical properties of the ground (for
example, it is already being used by another group, or is an entrance to a building)
the best policy for a university should be to promulgate rules that expressly permit
nondisruptive student speech everywhere where students have a right to be.
Such an approach permits responsible students to fully exercise their
constitutional rights and partake of the university experience, while simultaneously
allowing the university to protect those same students from harm. Alternatively, if
universities are truly interested in "establishing a Hyde Park corner, ' '261 then such
an area can be designated as a place where time, place, and manner regulations are
lessened, or where reservation of space need not be procured. Either way, such an
approach should be clear that expressive activity is not limited to that area.
Place restrictions are at best a lazy attempt to deal with the potential side
effects of vigorous First Amendment activity. Besides that, they can be confusing,
they make university officials look like censors, and they cause unrest even among
those students who do not currently have a need to protest, but feel that their school
will not permit them to peaceably express themselves should the need arise.
When I originally drafted this Note, speech zones had rarely been challenged.
This appears to be changing. I am delighted to see that the FIRE, a civil libertarian
organization, has forcefully taken the fight against university speech zone
restrictions to the courts. Hopefully, in the coming years, the appellate courts will
be forced to deal head-on with the issue of campus speech zone restrictions.
While this Note has demonstrated that certain speech zones may be
constitutional under public forum doctrine, universities may wish to take the route
of West Virginia University by amending speech zone policies to combat only
disruptive speakers while leaving peaceful students alone. Perhaps, as Harvey
Silverglate, co-founder of the FIRE has said, universities will recognize "that our
entire country is a free speech zone,
and that our campuses of higher education, of
' 262
all places, cannot be an exception.

260. The ACLU has recently brought suit against the "University of Maryland at
College Park on behalf of students after it limited free speech to one campus amphitheater
and restricted where students could distribute literature." Id.
261. See Archibold, supra note 1.
262. Silverglate & Gewolb, supra note 8.

